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Abstract— Phishing attacks have become the most used 
technique in the online scams, initiating more than 91% of 
cyberattacks, from 2012 onwards.  This study reviews how 
Phishing and Spear Phishing attacks are carried out by the 
phishers, through 5 steps which magnify the outcome, increasing 
the chance of success. 
The focus will be also given on four different layers of 
protection against these social engineering attacks, showing 
their strengths and weaknesses; the first and second layers 
consist of automated tools and decision-aid tools. The third one 
is users’ knowledge and expertise to deal with potential threats. 
The last layer, defined as “external”, will underline the 
importance of having a Multi-factors authentication, an 
effective way to provide enhanced security, creating a further 
layer of protection against Phishing and Spear Phishing. 
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I. INTRODUCTION  
Originally invented in 1989 to connect universities and 
scientific communities around the globe [1], the Internet is 
now a popular tool for entertainment, to run activities, 
communicate with friends and deliver information. However, 
some people are exploiting their anonymity to cheat others; 
Phishing attacks are the most widely used technique [2]. 
Phishing has been defined as a “social engineering attack 
that uses e-mail, social network webpages, and other media to 
communicate messages intended to persuade potential victims 
to perform certain actions [e.g. entering login credentials in a 
cloned webpage, downloading an attachment embedded with 
a malware or opening an infective hyperlink] or divulge 
confidential information for the attacker’s benefit in the 
context of cyber security” [3]. 
Phishing can lead to the exposure of intimate information, 
financial loss and a reduction in trust [4]. More than 91% of 
cyberattacks, from 2012 onwards, were initiated with a 
Phishing attack and in 2018 almost one third of the total data 
breaches involved Phishing or Spear Phishing [5], which is a 
targeted Phishing attack, studied and applied to a specific user 
or set of users [6].  
This paper aims to investigate how Phishing and Spear 
Phishing attacks are performed, by analysing 5 different steps 
a Phisher carries out to hack the victim. Furthermore, different 
techniques which help users to protect against them will be 
presented: automated tools and decision-aid tools are the first 
two layers of defence.  
The remainder of this paper will point out how knowledge 
and training, which constitute the third layer of protection, are 
the most effective techniques not to be deceived by Phishing. 
In conclusion, the Multi-Factor Authentication (MFA), a 
security system which certifies users’ identity by requesting 
multiple credentials will be suggested as possible further and 
“external” layer of defence. 
 
II. SPEAR PHISHING AND SOCIAL MEDIA 
Although e-mail remains the favourite medium for the 
Spear Phishing attacks, social media has now opened the way 
to new attack vectors [7].  These “social” platforms are the 
most effective place for scammers to devise elaborate Spear 
Phishing campaigns, often against politicians and the military 
[8]; indeed, 25% of all Phishing attacks are against state actors 
and 70% of all state attacks are by Phishing [9].  
The 2016 U.S. election can be considered a ‘classic’ 
example of cyber espionage by a Spear Phishing attack. John 
Podesta, Hillary Clinton’s campaign manager, and Colin 
Powell, the former U.S. Secretary of State, were deceived by 
fake phishing advertisements and their credentials were stolen 
by the Russian hackers’ group, Fancy Bear. All the mails 
between them and Hilary Clinton were then published on the 
webpage WikiLeaks [10]. 
A problem, such as this, could be not only experienced by 
state actors but also by the general public, who potentially are 
less protected. 
 
III. A SPEAR PHISHING MODEL  
The ‘theoretical model of Spear Phishing on social media’ 
developed by Michael Bossetta shows how illiberal regimes 
perform this kind of social engineering attack to assault 
Western democracies [11]. 
Although Michael Bossetta specific context was 
“political”, it could be argued that his theory is more widely 
applicable to the general public. This theory involves 5 steps 
through which the Phisher leads the spear-phishing attack: 
 
1. Collect 
Gathering information on a specific target by exploiting all 
the available information shared throughout social media to 
increase the chances of a successful attack [12]. Actors have, 
at this point, collected personal information such as phone 
numbers, e-mail addresses, interests, working or educational 
history [13]. 
In the 2017 French election, Facebook detected and 
blocked 24 profiles collecting information about Macron’s 
campaign. The actor behind those profiles was observing the 
victims in order to draw up an elaborated and customised 
attack. The “bad actor”, using Bossetta’s term, was discovered 
to be the same one as in the American election, the Russian 
hacking group Fancy Bear [14]. 
 
2. Construct 
Creating fake social media accounts in order to engage 
with targets. The new persona usually has fabricated 
credentials which establish a common ground with the victim, 
very often, the same work organisation or university [15]. 
A Spear Phishing attack by Iranian hackers hit the Saudi 
Arabian organizations, by creating fake LinkedIn, Facebook, 
Twitter and Instagram accounts; “Mia Ash” which mimicked 
an appealing Romanian female, sharing common interests 
with the victims [16]. 
 
3. Contact 
Contacting the victims. The first approach begins with the 
“friend request” and once accepted, the phisher can have 
access to non-public information about the target [17].  
Another way of contact is the direct message which could 
contain the infected hyperlink. In the American election, 
mentioned above, the method of contact used by the Russian 
group was the advertising campaign. Using the algorithm, they 
calculated a strategic time when people were mostly online, to 
send tweets likely to be clicked by their victims. The attack 
was successful, 70% of people clicked on those 
advertisements [18]. 
 
4. Compromise 
Installing malware on the victim’s device in order to 
compromise it and steal information [19]. This is what 
CyberCaliphate, the Isis-affiliated group did in 2015, they 
hacked many Youtube and Twitter accounts of the U.S. 
Central command’s employees to spread propaganda [20].  
Once malware is installed, the victim may be unaware, and 
attackers might remain undetected for years [21]. 
 
5. Contagion 
The last step of this model is contagion. Bad actors could 
exploit the hacked account to spread the attack over related 
people, magnifying the outcome [22]. 
As Bossetta explains: “Contagion is especially dangerous 
because threat actors can target vulnerable victims and scale 
up to bigger targets” [23]. 
In the case of the U.S. State Department, an Iranian 
hackers’ group in 2015 managed to violate the administration 
department by compromising the Facebook accounts of young 
employees [24]. 
IV. HOW TO DEFEND AGAINST THE ATTACKS 
The protection against the Phishing and Spear Phishing 
attacks is provided through different layers of defence: 
1. Automated tools 
Prevention and detection are the first layer of protection 
against Phishing attacks, thus different automated tools for 
Phishing detection have been implemented [25]: 
- Anti-phishing e-mail tool on a server to block 
Phishing content. 
- Websites containing blacklist of detected Phishing 
URLs and IP addresses. 
- Browser extensions to assess whether a page is 
genuine or not (Phishing websites). 
Anti-phishing e-mail tools are meant to block Phishing 
content such as link, contained in mails, at server and client 
levels and it is estimated that the 89.5% of infected mails are 
detected through this process. [37] 
Furthermore, websites containing blacklists of detected 
Phishing URLs and IP addresses are used to assess whether a 
webpage is genuine or not in case the user encounters a 
possible scam link which asks for credentials or bank 
information. 
Many Browsers provide extensions meant to alert people 
about a not genuine page. They are based on blacklist 
databases of old detected fraudulent URLs, regularly 
updated.[38] 
However, although researchers have suggested these 
techniques to prevent Phishing attacks, Phishers are becoming 
ever-more sophisticated in their approaches following the 
structure, explained above, and creating strategies in order to 
bypass the Anti-Phishing tools [26]. 
2. Decision-aid tools 
In the context of e-mails, e-mails filter tools are not 
infallible, whenever the infected e-mails step over the 
detection tool, people are called to make a decision concerning 
a webpage or link’s legitimacy [27].  
As a result, decision-aid tools were introduced as a second 
layer of protection in order to alert people regarding a detected 
fraudulent website: 
- Dynamic security skins. 
A tool which allows an external server to demonstrate 
the integrity of the questionable link without 
compromising the machine and the information of the 
user [42].  
- Browser toolbars. 
A Browser toolbar meant to provide feedback (red 
icon when the link is infective, orange if it is unknown 
or green if secure) upon the legitimacy of the web 
page the user has opened [41]. 
- Browser Phishing notifications. 
These work like the above tools (Browser toolbars) 
but the feedback given to the user is a “flash 
notification”, which makes him think about the 
integrity of the page and its provenance. 
- Sockets layer warnings.  
Although many Phishing attacks are carried out over 
HTTP protocol, a significant number run on websites 
for which SSL certificates have been issued [39]. 
Sockets layer warnings alert users regarding an 
infective link running on the protocol HTTPS which 
should be, “theoretically”, secure [40]. 
These tools identify potential risks, actively or passively, 
to online user [28]: 
- Active warnings: coloured graphic icons that catch 
user’s attention, by making users take action 
regarding the danger (either closing the webpage or 
continuing). 
- Passive warnings:  coloured graphic icons which 
notify users about a possible danger without blocking 
their activity. 
3. Training and knowledge 
 “Yet, the decision-aid tools have been evidenced as 
ineffective with usability issues. Users showed lack of 
understanding of the decision aid warnings in general” [29]. 
“The last line of defence is your human firewall” [30], 
hence training and knowledge have proved to be the most 
useful and crucial layer of protection; prior researches, indeed, 
showed that knowledge gained from training enhanced 
effectiveness of a Phishing warning making people act 
safely[31]. 
4. External protection 
A part these 3 layers, another form of protection could be 
provided by Multi Factor Authentication (MFA), a security 
system which certifies users’ identity by involving multiple 
credentials [44].  
The Single factor authentication, which implies the user to 
enter only his credentials (usually mail or username and 
password) in order to get the access to either a website or 
system, has to be replaced by two-factor authentication (2FA) 
or better multi-factor authentication (MFA) [43].  
Indeed, rather than just asking for a username and 
password, MFA needs other credentials, e.g. fingerprint, facial 
recognition or an answer to a pre-set question [48]. 
In cases where the bad actor is attempting to obtain user 
login credentials, multi-factor authentication (MFA) has 
proved to be a key defence. In the worst-case scenario MFA 
mitigates the malicious actor’s ability to log in to a given 
account or server, limiting the damage [34]. 
MFA is an effective way to provide enhanced security, 
creating a further layer of protection. Traditional usernames 
and passwords may be stolen by the Phisher and scammer, 
through Phishing and Spear Phishing [47]. Moreover, 
credentials could be found through the brute force attacks or 
be already published on the deep web, visible to anyone 
looking for databases breaches. 
Here below there are some examples of different MFA: 
- Codes generated by mobile applications. 
- Codes generated by mobile USB. 
- Fingerprints. 
- Codes sent via SMS or email.  
- Facial recognition. 
- Iris scan  
- Answer to pre-set personal questions 
What is more, MFA functionality refers to 3 different types 
of “authentication factors” [45]: 
- What you are: authenticated by biometrics, such as 
fingerprints or iris scan. 
- What you have: authenticated by a code sent via mail 
or SMS. 
- What you know: authenticated by a password or PIN. 
Multi-factor authentication does not offer a foolproof 
protection, but the combination of more than one 
authentication makes hacker’s work harder to get into users’ 
account.  
 
V. CONCLUSION 
After the disclosure of the Cambridge Analytica scandal 
and the Russian interference in the America election of 2016, 
social media platforms removed more than one thousand 
accounts related to the manipulation in order to limit the 
hacking activity [32]. 
In addition, several Anti-Phishing tools have been 
implemented and Decision-aid tools were introduced in order 
to help people make the right choice when they come across a 
possible Phishing danger. 
Different examples of Spear Phishing used for political 
reason, given in this paper, demonstrate that every network, 
even the most protected and sensible ones, can be exploited 
and hacked. Social engineering with Phishing and specifically 
Spear Phishing attacks are based on Human emotionality, 
making their detection more difficult.  
Physical defence layers are, undoubtedly, useful but not 
enough [46]; people have to be trained in order to achieve the 
awareness that not every page or link is genuine, everything 
has to be questioned and assessed, even a message from a 
person who pretends to be a friend [33]. 
In addition, as the recent Hacking Humans podcast 
suggests, attackers hold advantage over the users: “It’s not like 
a military operation, where the defender is meant to have most 
of the advantages. In cyberspace, the attacker can just keep 
trying and probing at low risk and low cost and he only has to 
be successful once. And e-mails filters designed to keep 
malicious scams out have a 10.5%  failure rate. That sounds 
pretty good but is not 0%. This isn’t baseball, if your technical 
defence fails in 1 out of 10 tries, you are out of luck and 
business. The last line of defense is your human firewall” [35]. 
To conclude, a constant and updated training helps people 
to be less vulnerable to these attacks, changing the fortunes of 
this “cyber war”. MFA may also enhance users defence layer 
in case their credentials have already been stolen, becoming 
the “very” last wall of protection. 
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